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WORKERS AND LABOR UNIONS SUSTAINED MAJOR 
DEFEATS IN THE 2017-2018 SUPREME COURT TERM IN 
EPIC SYSTEMS AND JANUS. HOW BAD IS IT? 
 





During the 2017-2018 Supreme Court Term, five conservative U.S. 
Supreme Court justices coalesced to inflict serious legal damage on workers 
and labor unions in two major decisions: Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis1 and 
Janus v. American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31.2 In Epic Systems, the Court ruled that that arbitration agreements 
in which the employees waive the right to pursue collective action to recover 
overtime wages allegedly due under the Fair Labor Standards Act are 
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.3 This ruling overturns a prior 
decision of the National Labor Relations Board holding that the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935 nullified arbitration agreements that prohibited 
employees of a home builder with operations in over twenty states from 
pursuing class actions to challenge their classification as exempt employees 
and pursue claims for overtime compensation.4 In Janus, the Court ruled the 
                                                   
 J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, 
New Jersey 08028. 
1 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority 
opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined. 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan 
joined. 
2 Janus v. American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2446 (2018). This double defeat is reminiscent of labor union’s losses in Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (permitting local municipalities to 
refuse to provide payroll deductions for contributions by public employees to the union’s 
political action committee by public employees), and Davenport v. Washington Education 
Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (upholding a State of Washington statute requiring public 
sector labor unions to receive affirmative authorization from individuals who were not 
member of the union but on whose behalf the union negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement before spending their agency fees for ideological or political purposes unrelated to 
the union’s collective bargaining responsibilities). See Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, 
Ysursa and Davenport: Putting a Dent in Union Access to Member Contributions, XIX S.L.J 
77 (2009), http://www.southernlawjournal.com/2009/06_Schoen-Falchek.pdf. 
3 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1633. 
4 Id. at 1620-21. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, and D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 
737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013). This NLRB decision was subsequently endorsed by the 
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collection of agency fees from public employees who “choose not to join the 
union and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective 
bargaining and related activities” violated the First Amendment rights of 
those employees not to be compelled to subsidize private speech on matters 
of public concern.5 This decision severs the obligation of public sector 
employees to pay fees or dues to their unions, even if those unions 
collectively bargain on behalf of those employees, and will likely negatively 
impact not only union revenues but also union membership.6 
The purpose of this article is to review Epic Systems and Janus to 
ascertain how workers and labor unions are affected by these decisions. Part 
II of this article will examine the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Epic 
Systems. Part III will examine the potential damage the Epic Systems 
decision inflicts on American workers. Part IV will examine the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Janus. Part V will examine the potential damage 
Janus inflicts on labor unions. 
 
II. EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. V. LEWIS 
 
In Epic Systems, employees in three companies, Epic Systems Corp., 
Ernst & Young LLP, and Murphy Oil USA, Inc., signed employment 
agreements which required them to arbitrate any employment claim against 
the company, limited the claims arbitrated solely to individual claims, and 
prohibited the arbitration of class action claims. The U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that the three cases “differ in detail but not in substance” and utilized 
the facts in the Ernst and Young case as illustrative.7 After his employment 
ended, Stephen Morris, an Ernst and Young junior accountant, claimed the 
firm misclassified its junior accountants as professional employees and 
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) by failing to pay them 
overtime compensation. Morris pursued a class action claim in federal 
district court on behalf of a nationwide class under the FLSA’s collective 
action provision. In response, Ernst and Young filed a motion to compel 
arbitration. The district court granted the motion, but the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, reasoning that the FLSA’s “savings clause” removes the 
                                                                                                                        
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, but rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Epic 
Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620. See NLRB v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th 
Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (case below in No. 16-
285); Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (case below in No. 16-300); 
and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (case below in 16-307).  
5 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
6 Mark J. Stern, Neil Gorsuch Just Demolished Labor Rights, ATLANTIC (May 21, 2018),  
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/neil-gorsuch-demolished-labor-rights-in-epic-
systems-v-lewis.html.  
7 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
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requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements be 
enforced as written.8 More particularly, the savings clause permits courts to 
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”9 The Ninth Circuit decided 
that the Ernst and Young employment agreement prohibiting class action 
arbitration violated § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides 
that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,”10 and 
hence fell within the “savings clause” and rendered the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable. 
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Federal Arbitration Act 
permitted employers to exclude class action claims from its arbitration 
provisions, and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ernst and Young and 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Epic Systems and affirmed the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Murphy Oil.11 In doing so, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed three major issues: (1) whether the savings clause of the Federal 
Arbitration Act rendered the prohibition against class action arbitration 
proceedings in the employment agreements unenforceable; (2) whether 
“concerted activities” provision of National Labor Relations Act overrides 
the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act; and (3) whether Chevron 
deference applied to the decision of the NLRB striking down prohibitions on 
class action arbitration proceedings. 
Concerning the first issue, the Court noted that “the savings clause 
recognizes only defenses that apply to ‘any’ contract,” i.e., the savings clause 
“permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” but those 
defenses do not include “defenses that apply only to arbitration” or defenses 
that “derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.”12 In other words, the Court explained, “the saving clause does not 
save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by more subtle 
methods, such as by ‘interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.’ 
”13 Relying on its prior decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,14 the 
Court determined that the “concerted activities” provision in the National 
                                                   
8 Id. 
9 9 U.S.C. § 2, Act Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1622. 
10 29 U.S.C. § 157, July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I, § 101, 
61 Stat. 140. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
11 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
12 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1622. 
13 Id. 
14 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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Labor Relations Act constituted a defense of legality which attempts to 
interfere with one of arbitration’s fundamental attributes, rather than a 
generally applicable contract defense.15 
In Concepcion, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, who purchased 
cellphones from AT&T Mobility and were required to pay sales tax on the 
retail value of the phones, pursued a class action lawsuit in U.S. District 
Court in the Southern District of California against AT&T Mobility for false 
advertising and fraud for promoting the sale of “free phones.” The 
consumers’ sales agreement contained an arbitration clause which restricted 
arbitration claims to individuals and prohibited any class action or 
representative arbitration proceeding.16 When AT&T Mobility moved to 
compel arbitration under the terms of the sales agreement, the Conceptions 
opposed the motion on the grounds the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable under California law, because it prohibited class action 
arbitration claims. Relying on the California Supreme Court decision in 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court,17 the district court determined that the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it prohibited class action 
arbitrations, and denied AT&T Mobility’s motion. Also relying on Discover 
Bank, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.18 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
because, unless the arbitration agreement explicitly permits class action 
arbitration claims, the Discover Bank rule interferes with arbitration by 
imposing additional burdens on the arbitrator to “first decide, for example, 
whether the class itself may be certified, whether the named parties are 
sufficiently representative and typical, and how discovery for the class 
should be conducted.”19 Moreover, “class arbitration requires procedural 
formality,” because, in order for the class action to be binding on absentees 
in the class, they must be adequately represented at all times, be afforded 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and have a right to opt out of the 
                                                   
15 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1622. 
16 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336.  
17 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (2005). The California Supreme Court 
determined the waiver of class action arbitration proceedings in arbitration agreements was 
unconscionable. 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts 
of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining 
power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers 
out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice 
the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful 
injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these circumstances, such 
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced. Id. 
at 162. 
18 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337-38. 
19 Id. at 348. 
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class.20 Likewise, “arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class 
litigation.”21 Procedural safeguards are built into class action litigation, such 
as interlocutory appeal of the certification decision and a separate appeal 
from the final judgment; in contrast an arbitral award can be vacated by a 
court only when the award “was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means,” the arbitrators displayed evident partiality or corruption, the 
arbitrators wrongfully refused to postpone the hearing or to hear pertinent 
and material evidence, or the arbitrators exceeded or misused their powers or 
failed to make a “mutual, final, and definite award.”22 Further, while the 
parties may contractually agree to undertake class action arbitration, the court 
found “it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no 
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would 
have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”23 Hence, the 
Court concluded, because California’s Discover Bank rule is an “obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress,” it was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.24 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Epic Systems determined that Concepcion 
prevents the Court from allowing a “contract defense to reshape traditional 
individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures 
without the parties consent.” Quite simply, “[j]ust as judicial antagonism 
toward arbitration before the Arbitration Act’s enactment manifested itself in 
a great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration to be against 
public policy,” so too must courts “be alert to new devices and formulas that 
would achieve much the same result today. And a rule seeking to declare 
individualized arbitration proceedings off limits is, the Court held, just such a 
device.”25 The Court concluded: 
 
The law of precedent teaches that like cases should generally be 
treated alike, and appropriate respect for that principle means the 
Arbitration Act's saving clause can no more save the defense at 
issue in these cases than it did the defense at issue in Concepcion. 
At the end of our encounter with the Arbitration Act, then, it 
appears just as it did at the beginning: a congressional command 
requiring us to enforce, not override, the terms of the arbitration 
agreements before us.26 
  
                                                   
20 Id. at 349. 
21 Id. at 350. 
22 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10).  
23 Id. at 351. 
24 Id. at 352. 
25 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1623. 
26 Id. 
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Concerning the second issue – whether the “concerted activities” 
language in Section 7 of the NLRA overrides the Federal Arbitration Act – 
the Court initially noted that the party seeking a determination that one 
statute displaces another has “a heavy burden” to demonstrate “a clearly 
expressed congressional intention that such a result should follow.”27 Section 
7 of the NLRA guarantees workers “the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”28 This language, the Court insisted, not only “does not express 
approval or disapproval of arbitration,” but does not “mention class or 
collective action procedures” or “even hint at a wish to displace the 
Arbitration Act – let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as 
our precedents demand.”29 Further, the Court noted, “some forms of group 
litigation existed even in 1935.” Hence “Section 7’s failure to mention them 
only reinforces that the statute doesn’t speak to such procedures.” Likewise, 
when a general term follows specific terms in a list, “the general term is 
usually understood to ‘embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the preceding specific words.’ ”30 Thus the term “other 
concerted activities” should be construed as encompassing activities 
employees do for themselves in the course of exercising their free association 
rights in the workplace, rather than highly regulated and more convoluted 
courtroom activities involving class and joint litigation.31 Similarly, the Court 
noted, “when Congress wants to mandate particular dispute resolution 
procedures it knows exactly how to do so,” and when Congress wanted to 
override the Arbitration Act, it clearly explained what it was trying to 
accomplish.32 Therefore, the “fact that we have nothing like that here is 
further evidence that Section 7 does nothing to address the question of class 
and collective actions.”33 
                                                   
27 Id. at 1624. 
28 29 U.S.C. § 157. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624.  
29 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624.  
30 Id. at 1625 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) (“the maxim 
ejusdem generis [is] the statutory canon that ‘[w]here general words follow specific words in a 
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in 
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words’ ”)). 
31 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625. 
32 Id. at 1626 (“by explaining, for example, that, ‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law, ... arbitration may be used ... only if’ certain conditions are met, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)”; 
or that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable” in other 
circumstances, 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2); or that requiring a party to 
arbitrate is ‘unlawful’ in other circumstances yet, 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3).”). 
33 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1626. 
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Furthermore, the Court noted that it “has heard and rejected efforts to 
conjure conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes” and 
“rejected every such effort to date . . . with statutes ranging from the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
the Credit Repair Organizations Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act.”34 In rejecting those efforts, the Court has made it clear 
that “even a statute's express provision for collective legal actions” does not 
necessarily preclude individual arbitration, and that “the absence of any 
specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is an important and 
telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration Act.” The Court 
then noted, that ‘[i]f all the statutes in all those cases did not provide a 
congressional command sufficient to displace the Arbitration Act, we cannot 
imagine how we might hold that the NLRA alone and for the first time does 
so today.” 
Concerning the third issue – whether Chevron deference applied to the 
decision of the NLRB striking down prohibitions on class action arbitration 
proceedings – the Court concluded “even under Chevron’s terms, no 
deference is due.”35 Quite simply, the Court noted, the NLRB in issuing its 
decision not only sought to interpret the NLRA in isolation, but also to limit 
a second statute, the Arbitration Act, which it does not administer, contrary 
to the Chevron mandate that the statutory ambiguity to be resolved appears in 
the statute the agency administers.36 In effect, the Court noted, the NLRB 
was attempting to “advance its statutory mission” by diminishing the scope 
of second statute, about which the agency has no particular interest or 
expertise, thereby “bootstrapping itself into an area in which it has no 
jurisdiction” and threatening “to undo rather than honor legislative 
judgment.”37 Furthermore, the Court observed, Chevron deference is 
                                                   
34 Id. at 1627 (citing American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013) 
(upholding class-action waiver provision in mandatory arbitration clause to foreclose 
restaurant’s attempt to pursue a class antitrust action); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant 
to arbitration agreement in securities registration application); CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) provisions 
requiring credit repair organizations to disclose to consumers their right to sue for violations of 
CROA and prohibiting waiver of any right under CROA did not preclude enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477 (1989) (predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act was 
enforceable); and Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
(customer claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, including RICO claims 
against the broker, were arbitrable under predispute arbitration agreement)). 
35 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1639. 
36 Id. at 1629. 
37 Id. 
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provided to assist Executive Branch officials, who are directly accountable to 
the people, make policy choices. Unfortunately, the Court stated, it is 
difficult to grant deference when the Executive Branch appears to be of “two 
minds,” the NLRB and the Solicitor General having submitted briefs 
disputing the meaning of the NLRA. Hence, “whatever argument might be 
mustered for deferring to the Executive on grounds of political 
accountability, surely it becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from 
both sides of its mouth, articulating no single position on which it might be 
held accountable.” Under these circumstances, the Court declared, “we will 
not defer.”38 
The Court concluded, “Congress has instructed that arbitration 
agreements like those before us must be enforced as written. While Congress 
is of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing suggesting it 
did so in the NLRA – much less that it manifested a clear intention to 
displace the Arbitration Act.” Rather, the Court said, “we can easily read 
Congress’s statutes to work in harmony” and “that is where our duty lies.”39 
 
III. EPIC SYSTEMS’ IMPACT ON EMPLOYEES 
 
The most significant damage inflicted by Epic Systems is identified by 
Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion, namely the diminishment of 
employees’ ability to “pursue joint, collective, and class suits related to the 
terms and conditions of their employment,”40 despite numerous decisions of 
the NLRB permitting workers to pursue collective FSLA and terms and 
condition of employment civil actions.41 Justice Ginsburg notes that “for 
decades, federal courts have endorsed the Board's view, comprehending that 
‘the filing of a labor related civil action by a group of employees is ordinarily 
a concerted activity protected by § 7.’”42 The Court’s decision that 
                                                   
38 Id. at 1630. 
39 Id. at 1632. 
40 Id. at 1637. 
41 Id. at 1637-38 (citing Spandsco Oil and Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948-49 (1942) (three 
employees' joint filing of FLSA suit ranked as concerted activity protected by the NLRA); 
Poultrymen's Service Corp., 41 N.L.R.B. 444, 460-63, and n. 28 (1942) (employee's filing of 
joint FLSA suit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated is concerted activity 
protected by the NLRA), enf'd, 138 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1943); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 149 
N.L.R.B. 147, 149, 153 (1964) (employees' filing class libel suit was protected by the NLRA); 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1018 (1980) (employee's filing class action 
regarding break times is protected by the NLRA), enf'd, 677 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1982); and 
Harco Trucking, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 478, 478-79 (2005) (employee's maintaining class action 
regarding wages is protected by the NLRA)). Similarly, federal courts for several decades 
have endorsed the Board's view that “the filing of a labor related civil action by a group of 
employees is ordinarily a concerted activity protected by § 7.”  
42 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1638. 
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“collective proceedings do not fall within the scope of § 7” weakens a 
significant safeguard of employees’ NLRA rights, because employers can 
now prevent class and collective actions merely by inserting the prohibition 
into the employment agreement. As Justice Ginsburg observes, “[f]orced to 
face their employers without company, employees ordinarily are no match 
for the enterprise that hires them,”43 which “is the very reason the NLRA 
secures against employer interference employees right to act in concert for 
the ‘mutual aid or protection.’ ”44 
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg states, the “inevitable result of today's 
decision will be the under enforcement of federal and state statutes designed 
to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”45 Chief among these are 
minimum wage and overtime law protections afforded workers. Noting that 
one study estimated low-wage workers lose almost $3 billion in legally owed 
wages in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York City alone and that another 
study claims that wage theft is costing workers hundreds of millions of 
dollars a year, Justice Ginsburg warns that federal and state government 
agencies and state attorneys general necessarily rely on private parties to play 
a leading role in enforcing wage and hour laws. The employees’ ability to do 
so, however, is seriously thwarted if “employers can stave off collective 
                                                   
43 Id. at 1640. 
44 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158. This causes Justice Ginsburg to declare: “Because I 
would hold that employees' § 7 rights include the right to pursue collective litigation regarding 
their wages and hours, I would further hold that the employer-dictated collective-litigation 
stoppers, i.e., “waivers,” are unlawful.”) Id. at 1641. The impact on nonunion employees will 
be enormous. As noted by Nina Totenberg: 
A study by the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute shows that 56 percent of 
nonunion private-sector employees are currently subject to mandatory individual 
arbitration procedures under the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, which allows 
employers to bar collective legal actions by employees. The court's decision 
means that tens of millions of private nonunion employees will be barred from 
suing collectively over the terms of their employment. Nina Totenberg, Supreme 
Court Decision Delivers Blow to Workers' Rights, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 21, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/21/605012795/supreme-court-decision-
delivers-blow-to-workers-rights.  
This impact is confirmed by the Los Angeles Times: 
About 60 million nonunionized workers in the private sector are covered by 
arbitration agreements that bar them from going to court to sue over alleged 
violations of federal workplace laws, according to a survey by the Economic 
Policy Institute, a liberal group based in Washington. Among them, about 25 
million are also required to arbitrate as individuals. Lawyers predicted Monday 
that number will rise quickly. David G. Savage, Supreme Court upholds 
arbitration that bans workers from joining forces over lost wages, L.A. TIMES 
(May 21, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-workers-
20180521-story.html.  
45 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1646.  
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employment litigation aimed at obtaining redress for wage and hours 
infractions” by simply restricting employee relief to individual claims.46 
Likewise, because the expense in pursuing individual claims outweigh the 
potential recovery, there is no incentive to seek redress and the “enforcement 
gap” will almost certainly widen.47 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg cautions, 
“fear of retaliation may also deter potential claimants from seeking redress 
alone,” individuals’ pursuit of small value claims obtain slim injunctive 
relief, and “[e]mployers, aware that employees will be disinclined to pursue 
small-value claims when confined to proceeding one-by-one, will no doubt 
perceive that the cost-benefit balance of underpaying workers tips heavily in 
favor of skirting legal obligations.”48 Finally, Justice Ginsburg warns, 
because arbitration outcomes can be kept confidential and lack precedential 
effect, “individual arbitration of employee complaints can give rise to 
anomalous results.”49 That means arbitrators can render incompatible awards 
in similar claims and inconsistent legal decisions, such as whether the 
employee’s position is exempt from overtime laws. All of these negative 
consequences cause Justice Ginsburg to fear that “the result of take-it-or-
leave-it labor contracts [harks] back to the type called ‘yellow dog,’50 and of 
                                                   
46 Id. at 1647. Inserting “these clauses make it easier for employers to maintain unfair and 
even unlawful employment structures and salary systems,” and the “court’s decision in Epic 
Systems will inevitably lead to an explosion of these imposed contracts.” Garrett Epps, An 
Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-court-decision-on-
employment/560963.  
47 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1647. 
48 Id. at 1647-48. This conclusion is corroborated by an article in the Los Angeles Times which 
reports: “Labor law experts said the impact of the ruling in Epic Systems vs. Lewis will fall 
heaviest on tens of millions of low-wage workers who do not belong to unions. As a practical 
matter, they said, workers at convenience stores, restaurants, hotels or the like will find it 
expensive and risky to bring complaints if they must do so on their own.” Epps, supra note 46. 
One commentator was even more blunt, stating: Epic Systems “effectively legalizes low-level 
wage theft; Juno Turner, a partner at the workers’ rights firm Outten & Golden, told me that it 
‘gives a free pass for companies to break the law,’ because “employers can now cheat workers 
with little risk that employees will enforce their rights.” Stern, supra note 6.  
49 Id. at 1648. 
50 “Yellow Dog” contracts were employment agreements in which the worker, as a condition 
of employment, promised not to join a union or to resign from a union if he or she was already 
a member. Yellow-dog contract, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, accessed on October 1, 2018 at 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/yellow-dog-contract. In the early stages of the Lochner era, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Yellow Dog contracts in Adair v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment due 
process clause protected individual’s right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of 
others and the sale of one’s own labor. As long as those terms were not injurious to public 
interests, the employer had the right to include terms which benefited the employer, and the 
employee had the right to insist on the terms upon which he would become an employee. Id. at 
172-73. It was the employer’s right to fire the employee because he was a member of a union, 
just as it was the right of employee to decline employment because his coworkers were not 
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the readiness of this Court to enforce those unbargained-for agreements” 
suppresses “the right of workers to take concerted action for their ‘mutual aid 
and protection.’ ”51 
 
IV. JANUS V. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 
 
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31 (hereinafter “Council 31” or “the union”), is the exclusive 
bargaining agent for employees of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and 
Family Services (hereinafter “Family Services”). Mark Janus, a child support 
specialist employed by Family Services, refused to join the union. Janus 
opposed the positions Council 31 adopted in its collective bargaining 
activities, because the wage demands of the union would aggravate the fiscal 
crisis then confronting the State of Illinois. Janus also objected to making the 
mandatory agency fee payment of $44.58 per month to the union to cover his 
share of the “chargeable” expenditures of the union for collective bargaining, 
contract administration, and dispute resolution activities. Janus and two other 
state employees filed a petition to intervene in an action previously initiated 
in federal district court by the Governor of Illinois, who challenged the 
imposition of the agency fee under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. 
                                                                                                                        
members of a union, “however unwise” those decisions might have been. Id. at 175. The 
Wagner Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., effectively overruled Adair, when it gave 
employees the right to join unions and bargain collectively with their employees, and outlawed 
yellow dog contracts and other unfair labor practices.  
51 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1648-49. As noted by one commentator: 
The Supreme Court . . . decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis [allows] employers to 
deprive their workers of their right to sue collectively. Its ruling . . . blasts a massive 
hole through post–New Deal labor law, hobbling employees’ ability to recover in 
court when their employers underpay them. It is difficult to overstate how 
devastating Epic Systems is to labor rights in America . . . .” Stern, supra note 6.  
Justice Ginsburg’s “yellow dog” comment caught Justice Gorsuch’s attention. He responded: 
“In [the dissent’s] view, today's decision ushers us back to the Lochner era when this Court 
regularly overrode legislative policy judgments. The dissent even suggests we have 
resurrected the long-dead ‘yellow dog’ contract. But like most apocalyptic warnings, this one 
proves a false alarm.” Id. at 1630. In his dissenting opinion in Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of 
D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), one of the Lochner era opinions in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
declared a minimum wage law unconstitutional, Chief Justice Taft reminds us why workers 
must take concerted action for their mutual aid and protection: 
Legislatures in limiting freedom of contract between employee and employer by a 
minimum wage proceed on the assumption that employees, in the class receiving 
least pay, are not upon a full level of equality of choice with their employer and in 
their necessitous circumstances are prone to accept pretty much anything that is 
offered. They are peculiarly subject to the overreaching of the harsh and greedy 
employer. Id. at 562-63. 
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The district court simultaneously granted Janus’ petition to intervene in the 
action and dismissed the Governor’s lawsuit, because, not having suffered a 
personal injury, the Governor lacked standing. Janus then filed his complaint 
in which he claimed the mandatory agency fee payments were “coerced 
political speech” contrary to the First Amendment, and the case proceeded on 
the basis of his complaint.52 
The district court granted Council 31’s motion to dismiss Janus’s 
complaint, because Janus’ claim was prohibited by a prior decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.53 In Abood the 
Court unanimously upheld a Michigan statute, which authorized union 
representation of state and municipal employees in an “agency shop” 
arrangement, and determined that the imposition of the agency fee on non-
union members did not violate the First Amendment.54 Janus appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, asking the Court to overrule Abood and hold agency 
fees arrangements are unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.55 
Janus is the fourth time since the Abood decision that Justice Alito has 
taken aim at mandatory agency fees. In Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 1000, public employees, who were represented 
by Local 1000 for collective bargaining in an agency shop arrangement, 
objected to a unilateral increase in union dues used to finance an opposition 
campaign to two proposed ballot propositions: Proposition 75, which would 
require unions to obtain the employees affirmative consent before charging 
them fees used for political purposes, and Proposition 76, which empowered 
the governor to reduce state appropriations for public employee 
compensation.56 The district court agreed with the objecting union members, 
and ordered the union to send a new Hudson notice57 to the union members 
                                                   
52 Janus v. American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2446, 
2460-62, 2475 (2018). 
53 Id. at 2462. 
54 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235-38 (1977). 
55 Janus, 138 U.S. at 2462. 
56 Knox v. Service Employees International Union. Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 302-04 (2012). 
57 In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), several workers represented by 
the union objected to the use of their dues for purposes not related to collective bargaining and 
challenged the procedure implemented by the union to handle their objections. Id. at 297. The 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the procedures enacted by the union to deal with nonmember 
objections were inadequate for three reasons. First, the union was permitted to use the 
objectors’ dues temporarily for purposes to which they objected, rather than preliminarily 
obtaining their consent to finance activities unrelated to collective bargaining. Second, the 
procedures failed to provide nonmembers with sufficient information about the basis on which 
the proportionate share was calculated in advance of their raising an objection; instead, the 
union provided information about the calculation of the proportionate share after the objectors 
filed their objections. Further, the information ultimately provided to the objectors was 
inadequate, because it failed to disclose the expenditures for collective bargaining and 
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giving them 45 days to object and receive a full refund of that portion of their 
dues used for political purposes. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.58 Justice Alito stated 
that the “free rider” justification for requiring union workers to pay the 
“chargeable” portion of their union dues “represents something of an 
anomaly – one that we found to be justified by the interest in furthering 
‘labor peace.’ ”59 While he observed that permitting a union to collect fees 
from nonmembers using an opt-out system approaches, if not crosses, the 
limits of what the First Amendment tolerates under the Court’s prior 
decisions, the “aggressive” fee collection process employed by Local 1000 
“is indefensible.”60 To begin with, Local 1000 failed to give the nonmembers 
a fresh Hudson notice before levying the special assessment. Doing so would 
have permitted the nonmembers to elect not to support either or both of the 
propositions, rather than using their dues to oppose both propositions and 
then forcing them after the fact to wait for reimbursement.61 Second, forcing 
union members to wait until the next annual Hudson notice was sent to 
oppose the propositions did “not fully recompense nonmembers.”62 Indeed 
even full recompense of the union dues used to oppose the propositions 
                                                                                                                        
administration that benefited all members and nonmembers alike and for which a fee could be 
charged; the mere disclosure of a percentage of expenditures does not explain why they were 
required to pay dues. Third, the procedure failed to provide “a reasonably prompt decision by 
an impartial decision maker.” Id. at 307. The Court noted that the nonunion employee “is 
entitled to have his objections addressed in expeditious, fair, and objective manner.” Id. The 
procedure employed by the union did not meet this standard, because it permitted the union, 
an interested party, to control the process from the moment the process begins (collection of 
the dues), through the two-step appeal process (controlled by the union executive committee 
and union executive board), and through the final arbitration (decided by a union-selected 
arbitrator). Id. at 308. In sum, “the original Union procedure was inadequate, because it failed 
to minimize the risk that nonunion employees’ contributions might be used for impermissible 
purposes, because it failed to provide adequate justification for the advance reduction of dues, 
and because it failed to offer a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision maker.” 
Id. at 309. Notably, then, Hudson requires the union to make significant disclosures to 
employees so that they can make an informed decision to object to the expenditures of dues 
and fees for purposes not related to collective bargaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment. More particularly, the union must inform the employees (1) how it 
calculated the proportion of expenditures for activities unrelated to collective bargaining, 
contract administration, and grievance adjustment, and (2) the nature of expenditures included 
under the category of collective bargaining and contract administration that benefited 
members and nonmembers alike. Further, the union’s disclosure of this information must be 
made before the employee is given the opportunity to object to expenditure of dues and fees 
for purposes not related to collective bargaining and contract administration. 
58 Knox, 567 U.S. at 306. 
59 Id. at 311. 
60 Id. at 314. 
61 Id. at 315. 
62 Id. at 316. 
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would not satisfy the First Amendment, because it permits the union to 
“extract a loan from unwilling nonmembers” and payment of loan after the 
union’s political objectives were achieved is “cold comfort” to objecting 
nonmembers.63 Third, Local 1000 employed the prior year’s audited 
chargeable percentage when it sent out its annual Hudson notice, and doing 
so “makes no sense,” because it wrongfully assumes that the percentages of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses vary little from one year to the 
next.64 Likewise, Local 1000 uses an impermissibly broad classification 
system in allocating chargeable and nonchargeable expenses, claiming for 
example that “all funds spent on ‘lobbying . . . the electorate’ are 
chargeable.”65 Fourth, Local 1000 procedures force nonmembers who wish 
to challenge the classification of expenses “to come up with the resources to 
mount the legal challenge in a timely fashion,” placing a heavy burden on 
objecting nonmembers “simply to avoid having their money taken to 
subsidize speech with which they disagree.”66 Finally, extracting fees from 
nonmembers and using an opt-out procedure to reclaim the extracted fees 
when annual dues are billed, rather than employing opt-in procedure before 
extracting fees from nonmembers, “substantially impinge[s] upon the First 
Amendment rights of nonmembers.”67 Hence, the Court ruled, “when a 
public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union 
must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from 
nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”68 
In Harris v. Quinn, an opinion also authored by Justice Alito, the Court 
declined to extend Abood to personal assistants providing home health care 
to individuals who otherwise would require institutionalization.69 By 
executive order, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich called for state 
recognition of a union to serve as the personal assistants’ exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with the state. Several 
months later the Illinois legislature codified that order and declared those 
personal assistants to be employees of the State of Illinois “solely for the 
purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.” 
Following a vote of the personal assistants, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & 
Indiana (SEIU-HII) was designated to be the personal assistants’ exclusive 
representative for collective bargaining purposes. The State and the union 
negotiated collective-bargaining agreements requiring the personal assistants 
who were not members of the union to pay agency fees and permitting those 
                                                   
63 Id. at 317. 
64 Id. at 318. 
65 Id. at 320. 
66 Id. at 319. 
67 Id. at 321. 
68 Id. at 322. 
69 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). 
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fees (more than $3.6 million) to be deducted from the personal assistants’ 
Medicaid payments. Three personal assistants pursued a class action claim in 
federal district court in which they sought an injunction against enforcement 
of the agency fee provision and a determination that the mandatory payment 
of the agency fees violates the First Amendment.70 The federal district court 
dismissed their claims. The Seventh Circuit decided “that Illinois and the 
customers who receive in-home care are ‘joint employers’ of the personal 
assistants,” and “the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of 
Abood.’”71 In his opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit, Justice Alito 
castigates Abood. Justice Alito states (1) Abood failed to appreciate that core 
issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues in 
the public sector, but generally are not important political issues in the 
private sector;72 (2) Abood failed to appreciate the difficulty in distinguishing 
core union speech related to collective bargaining and core union speech 
related to political ends, both of which are directed to the government; in 
contrast core union speech related to collective bargaining in the private 
sector is directed to the employer and lobbying and political advocacy are 
directed at the government;73 (3) Abood failed to anticipate the enormous 
difficulty in classifying public-sector union expenditures as “chargeable” or 
“non-chargeable”;74 (4) Abood failed to anticipate significant litigation 
expense impose on union members who challenge the classification of 
expenditures;75 and (5) Abood “rests on an unsupported empirical 
assumption, namely, that the principle of exclusive representation in the 
public sector is dependent on a union or agency shop.”76 
Finally, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had its third crack at Abood. Upon the death of Justice Alito 
on February 13, 2016, however, the Court was evenly divided, and, on March 
29, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order affirming the judgment of the 
Ninth Circuit.77 
                                                   
70 Id. at 2626. 
71 Id. at 2627. 
72 Id. at 2632. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 2633. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2634. 
77 Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (citing Abood, the 
Ninth Circuit issued the following order: “The court has reviewed appellants' motion for 
summary affirmance and appellees' opposition thereto, the record, and the briefing filed in this 
appeal. Upon review, the court finds that the questions presented in this appeal are so 
insubstantial as not to require further argument, because they are governed by controlling 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.” Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 
2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. 2014). The decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit is Friedrichs 
v. California Teachers Ass’n, 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In Friedrichs, public 
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In his opinion in Janus, Justice Alito first examines the justifications for 
agency fees the court advanced in Abood: “labor peace” and the “risk of free 
riders.” Justice Alito claims that “labor peace” is the “main defense of the 
agency-fee arrangement,” i.e., “avoidance of the conflict and disruption that 
[Abood] envisioned would occur if the employees in a unit were represented 
by more than one union.”78 Justice Alito noted that Abood cited no evidence 
“that the pandemonium it imagined would result if agency fees were not 
allowed,” incorrectly assumed designating the union as the exclusive 
bargaining agent and agency fees were inextricably linked, and declared “it is 
now clear that Abood’s fears were unfounded,” as evidenced by the federal 
and state government employment: 79 
 
Under federal law, a union chosen by majority vote is designated as 
the exclusive representative of all the employees, but federal law 
does not permit agency fees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7111(a), 
7114(a). Nevertheless, nearly a million federal employees – about 
27% of the federal work force – are union members. The situation 
in the Postal Service is similar. Although permitted to choose an 
exclusive representative, Postal Service employees are not required 
to pay an agency fee, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1203(a), 1209(c), and about 
400,000 are union members. Likewise, millions of public 
employees in the 28 States that have laws generally prohibiting 
agency fees are represented by unions that serve as the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the 
case 41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is now 
undeniable that ‘labor peace’ can readily be achieved ‘through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms’ than 
the assessment of agency fees.80 
 
Justice Alito describes the “risk of free riders” as a contention that 
“agency fees are needed to prevent nonmembers from enjoying the benefits 
of union representation without shouldering the costs.”81 He notes that this 
                                                                                                                        
school teachers, who resigned their union membership and objected to paying the 
nonchargeable portion of their agency fee each year, asked the federal district court to declare 
the “opt out” procedures employed by their union to enable the nonmember teachers avoid 
making financial contributions in support of nonchargeable union expenditures violated their 
First Amendment Rights. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the 
defendant union, stating the “parties do not dispute that Abood and Mitchell foreclose 
Plaintiffs' claims, and the Court agrees that these decisions are controlling.” Id. at 2.). 
78 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2466. 
81 Id. 
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contention fails scrutiny: “Suppose that a particular group lobbies or speaks 
out on behalf of what it thinks are the needs of senior citizens or veterans or 
physicians, to take just a few examples. Could the government require that 
all seniors, veterans, or doctors pay for that service even if they object? It has 
never been thought that this is permissible.”82 Nor does the fact that the 
unions are required to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for all public 
employees (whether or not they are members of the union) justify the 
imposition of agency fees, because, Justice Alito notes, being designated as 
the exclusive representative confers many benefits. These benefits include 
giving the union a “privileged place in negotiation,” conferring a 
“tremendous increase in the power of the unions,” and granting the union 
“special privileges,” such as access to information about the employees and 
having “dues and fees deducted directly from the employee wages.” These 
benefits, the Court noted, greatly outweigh any extra burden imposed by the 
duty of providing fair representation for nonmembers,” i.e., not acting 
“solely in the interests of [the union’s] own members.”83 Similarly, Justice 
Alito states, representing nonmembers in grievance proceedings “furthers the 
union's interest in keeping control of the administration of the collective-
bargaining agreement,” because (1) the resolution of one employee's 
grievance can affect others,” and (2) the union’s control of the grievance 
process effectively subordinates “the interests of [an] individual employee . . 
. to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.”84 Hence, 
Justice Alito concludes, “agency fees cannot be upheld on free-rider 
grounds.”85 
The Court then considered and rejected the arguments advanced by the 
union that mandatory agency fees were constitutional under the First 
Amendment. In response to the union’s argument that the First Amendment 
as originally enacted was not designed to provide any free speech protection 
to public employees,86 the Court ruled that the union offered no basis for 
concluding Abood is supported by the original understanding of the First 
Amendment. In response to the union’s argument that the union’s activities 
were work related and therefore not considered protected speech under 
Pickering,87 the Court ruled that there was “no good reason . . . to shoehorn 
                                                   
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 2467. 
84 Id. at 2468 
85 Id. at 2469. 
86 Id. 
87 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering a high school teacher 
wrote a letter criticizing the school board’s allocation of funds between academic and athletic 
programs. The letter was published in a local newspaper in the middle of a campaign by the 
school board to gain voter approval of a tax increase, and the school board fired Pickering in 
retaliation. Id. at 564. Noting that the government funding of education is a matter of public 
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Abood into the Pickering framework,”88 and that, even if that attempt were 
made, “Pickering is a poor fit indeed.”89 In response to the union’s argument 
that “union speech in collective-bargaining and grievance proceedings should 
be treated like the employee speech in Garcetti,90 i.e. as speech pursuant to 
an employer’s official duties” which is not protected by the First 
Amendment, the Court determined that the “argument distorts collective 
bargaining and grievance adjustment beyond recognition” and that “if the 
union's speech is really the employer's speech, then the employer could 
dictate what the union says. Unions, we trust, would be appalled by such a 
suggestion.”91 Having dispatched the First Amendment arguments advanced 
by the union, the Court concluded that “public-sector agency-shop 
arrangements violate the First Amendment, and Abood erred in concluding 
otherwise.”92 The only remaining question, then, was whether the Court 
should overrule Abood. 
The Court delineated the five most important factors in determining 
whether Abood should be overruled: “the quality of Abood 's reasoning, the 
workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related 
decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and reliance 
on the decision.”93 Addressing the first factor, the Court states “Abood was 
poorly reasoned,” because it incorrectly relied on Hanson94 and Street95 in 
                                                                                                                        
concern and that teachers as members of the community have informed opinions on how 
school funds should be spent and should be able to speak freely on such questions without fear 
of retaliation, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the teacher’s letter was protected by the 
First Amendment, Further, because the teacher’s letter did not disrupt the harmony of his 
workplace or affect the delivery of educational services, because Pickering did not have a 
close working relationship with either school board members or the superintendent at whom 
his criticisms were directed, and because Pickering’s letter addressed and informed a matter of 
public concern best resolved through open debate, his dismissal from public employment 
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 571-72, 574-75.  
88 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2472. 
89 Id. at 2474. 
90 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). In Garcetti, the Court held that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421. In reaching this decision, the Court 
stated government speech trumps government employee speech whenever the employee’s 
expression “owes its existence to [the] employee's professional responsibilities,” id. at 421-22, 
and is created pursuant to “the duties the employee is actually expected to perform.” Id. at 
424-25. 
91 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474. 
92 Id. at 2478. 
93 Id. at 2478-79. 
94 Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In Hanson, employees of the 
Union Pacific Railroad brought suit in Nebraska courts against the railroad and the labor 
organizations representing employees of the railroad to enjoin the enforcement of a union shop 
agreement, which required all employees of the railroad to become members of the union 
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validating the agency arrangement. Those decisions, the Court insisted, did 
not validate the payment of agency fees; rather, they simply determined that 
Congress authorized private sector union shops under the Railway Labor 
Act.96 Furthermore, Abood incorrectly applied a deferential standard in 
determining the constitutionality of agency fees that is unsupported by free 
speech cases, failed to evaluate independently the strength of the government 
interests cited to support the imposition of agency fees, and did not assess 
whether agency fees actually promoted those interests.97 If Abood had 
considered these interests properly, the Court insisted, it might not have 
made the serious mistake of assuming that “labor peace” was a substantial 
government interest and that the designation of the union as the exclusive 
                                                                                                                        
within sixty days. Id. at 227. The plaintiff employees were not members of the union, did not 
want to become members of the union, and did not want to lose their jobs and employments 
benefits if they refused to join the union. The employees argued that the union shop 
arrangement authorized by the Railway Labor Act violated the “right to work” provision of the 
Nebraska constitution. Id. at 227-28. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the union shop 
provisions of the Railway Labor Act as a valid exercise by Congress of its powers under the 
Commerce clause to “regulate labor relations in interstate commerce,” “encourage the 
settlement of disputes,” and achieve “[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce.” Id. at 
233. The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled the union shop arrangement did not violate the First 
Amendment rights of the union members, noting that “there is no more an infringement or 
impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by 
state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar,” that the record contained nothing to 
demonstrate that mandatory membership in the union impaired the union members’ freedom 
of expression, and that the statutory restriction against any conditions upon membership in the 
union except for the payment of dues, initiation fees, and assessments safeguarded the union 
members freedom of expression. Id. at 238.  
95 International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In Street, members 
of a group of labor organizations representing workers employed by the Southern Railway 
System in a union shop arrangement sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 
collective bargaining agreement, because the unions expended member dues to finance 
political campaigns of candidates for state and federal offices whom they opposed and to 
promote political ideologies with which they disagreed. The U.S. Supreme Court refrained 
from deciding the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act which authorized the union shop 
arrangement. Rather, the Court construed the Railway Labor Act as prohibiting expenditures 
of union members’ dues without their consent to assist candidates for public office or advance 
political causes and permitting unions to spend member sues to cover the expenses of 
collective bargaining and administration and disposition of grievances and disputes without 
the members’ consent. Id. at 750, 763-64. The Court carefully reviewed the history of union 
security in the railway industry and the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act, and 
concluded: (1) “§ 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory unionism to force employees to share 
the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs of the 
adjustment and settlement of disputes,” id. at 764; (2) Congress refrained from giving unions 
“unlimited power to spend exacted money,” id. at 768; and (3) § 2, Eleventh, “is to be 
construed to deny the unions, over an employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted 
funds to support political causes which he opposes.” Id. at 768-69. 
96 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478-79. 
97 Id. at 2480. 
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bargaining agent is inextricably linked to the imposition of agency fees.98 
Nor did Abood properly consider the difference between public- and private-
sector agency shops. More particularly, collective bargaining with a 
government employer, unlike collective bargaining in the private sector, 
inherently involved political speech. Hence, Justice Alito, concludes, “Abood 
was not well reasoned.”99 
Addressing the second factor – the workability of the rule it established 
– the Court notes that “Abood 's line between chargeable and nonchargeable 
union expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw with precision.”100 
While the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to provide some precision in 
Lehnert,101 in which the court adopted a three-part test to determine if 
expenses were chargeable, each of the three factors involves a substantial 
judgment call reducing the test to an amorphous standard that invited 
litigation.102 Moreover, the Court observes, the union concedes Abood’s 
chargeable and nonchargeable categories suffer from vagueness and invites 
the Court to revisit Abood and draw a firmer line. This concession, the Court 
notes, “underscores the reality that Abood has proved unworkable.”103 
Crucially, this lack of precision makes the task of challenging the union’s 
classification of expenses “daunting and expensive,” as evidenced by the 
Hudson notices under scrutiny in Janus and in the other cases that have come 
before the court which lack “sufficient information to gauge the propriety of 
the union’s fee.”104 
Addressing the third factor – consistency with other related decisions – 
Justice Alito repeated his characterization of Abood as an “anomaly,” as 
noted above in the discussion of Harris105 and Knox.106 Moreover, the Court 
                                                   
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2481. 
100 Id. 
101 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). In Lehnert, faculty members 
employed by Ferris State College, a state-related public institution of higher education 
supported by the State of Michigan, objected to the expenditures of funds by the Ferris Faculty 
Association, the exclusive bargaining representative of the faculty in an agency shop 
arrangement. The objecting faculty members claimed that the expenditures in question were 
used for purposes other than negotiating and administering the collective bargaining 
agreement, thereby violating their First Amendment Rights. Id. at 511. The U.S. Supreme 
Court developed a three-part test to determine if the expenses were chargeable: “[C]hargeable 
activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the 
government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not 
significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency 
or union shop.” Id. at 519. 
102 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481. 
103 Id. at 2481-82. 
104 Id. at 2482. 
105 Harris is discussed supra at notes 69-75.  
106 Knox is discussed supra at notes 56 and 58-68. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2483. 
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observed, subsequent decisions addressing compelled speech and association 
“employed exacting scrutiny, if not a more demanding standard” of review, 
which was lacking in Abood.107 Likewise, as noted above in the discussion of 
Knox and Harris, the Court declined to extend Abood in other agency fee 
cases “beyond the circumstances where it directly controls.”108 Further, the 
Court notes that Abood “particularly sticks out when viewed against our 
cases holding that public employees generally may not be required to support 
a political party.”109 “It is an odd feature of our First Amendment cases,” the 
Court observes, “that political patronage has been deemed largely 
unconstitutional, while forced subsidization of union speech (which has no 
such pedigree) has been largely permitted.”110 
Addressing the fourth factor – developments since the decision was 
handed down – the Court declared “[d]evelopments since Abood, both factual 
and legal, have also ‘eroded’ the decision's ‘underpinnings’ and left it an 
outlier among our First Amendment cases.”111 To begin with, Abood is based 
on the unsupported assumption that the principle of exclusive representation 
in the public sector depends on either a union or an agency shop, an 
assumption belied by the above noted analysis of union membership in the 
public sector.112 Second, an unanticipated increase in membership in public 
sector unions – public sector union memberships exceeds private sector 
union membership, even though there are nearly four times as many private 
sector employees as public sector employees – has triggered a parallel 
increase in public sector spending, and wages, benefits, and pensions have 
played a substantial role in that increase. These developments and the related 
political debate over public spending and debt have given public sector 
collective bargaining political power and influence that Abood did not 
anticipate.113 
Addressing the fifth factor – reliance on the decision – the Court 
rejected the union’s argument that collective-bargaining agreements 
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presently in effect were negotiated with the expectation agency fees would 
continue, in exchange for which the union may have surrendered other 
benefits. “It would be unconscionable,” the Court stated, “to permit free 
speech rights to be abridged in perpetuity in order to preserve contract 
provisions that will expire on their own in a few years' time.”114 Indeed, the 
Court stressed, “public-sector unions have been on notice for years regarding 
this Court's misgivings about Abood,” as spelled out in Knox, Harris, and 
Friedrichs, discussed above.115 Hence, “any public-sector union seeking an 
agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining agreement must have 
understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was uncertain.”116 
This is particularly true, the Court insisted, with respect to the collective 
bargaining agreement in Janus. The original term of the agreement was July 
1, 2012, to June 30, 2015, after which the agreement was automatically 
renewed annually, neither party having given notice it wanted to amend or 
terminate the agreement. This caused the Court to observe that “the Union 
could not have been confident about the continuation of the agency-fee 
arrangement for more than a year at a time.”117 Similarly, the Court noted, 
the collective-bargaining agreement contains a severability clause which 
keeps the remaining provisions of the contract in effect in the event any part 
of the agreement was invalidated. Any union believing that an agency-fee 
provision was essential to its bargain,” the Court stated, “could have insisted 
on a provision giving [the agency-fee provision] greater protection.”118 While 
the Court recognized that “the loss of payments from nonmembers may cause 
unions to experience unpleasant transition costs in the short term, and may 
require unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain members,” it 
declared that the “unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to continue 
indefinitely.”119 
The Court concluded: “All these reasons – that Abood 's proponents 
have abandoned its reasoning, that the precedent has proved unworkable, that 
it conflicts with other First Amendment decisions, and that subsequent 
developments have eroded its underpinnings – provide the special 
justification[s] for overruling Abood.”120 The Court then held: (1) states and 
public-sector unions are prohibited from extracting agency fees from 
nonconsenting employees, (2) “[n]either an agency fee nor any other 
payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may 
any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee 
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affirmatively consents to pay,” and (3) nonmembers who agree to pay waive 
their First Amendment rights, and, in order to be effective, that waiver must 
be freely given, evidenced by clear and compelling evidence, and obtained 
before any money is taken.121 Finally, the Court stated, “Abood was wrongly 
decided and is now overruled.”122 
 
V. JANUS’S IMPACT ON UNIONS 
 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan identifies the immediate 
ramifications of Janus: 
 
[Janus] will have large-scale consequences. Public employee 
unions will lose a secure source of financial support. State and local 
governments that thought fair-share provisions furthered their 
interests will need to find new ways of managing their workforces. 
Across the country, the relationships of public employees and 
employers will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected 
ways.123 
 
Justice Kagan notes that over 22 states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico have enacted statutes authorizing fair-share provisions, and two 
additional states have fair-share provisions for their police and firefighter 
unions.124 Moreover, many of those states have multiple statutory provisions 
with variations of fair-share provisions for different categories of public 
employees.125 The parties to these agreements will now be required to “revise 
(or redo) multiple contracts simultaneously,” a chore made much more 
difficult because the parties will now have to “replace a term that [they] 
never expected to change.”126 This bargaining, she cautions, will likely be 
complicated and possibly contentious given the interests at stake.127 
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By cutting off the flow of agency fees to unions, Janus will cost unions, 
already under considerable political pressure, to lose tens of millions of 
dollars and to see their effectiveness diminished.128 Benjamin Sachs, the 
Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry at Harvard Law School, 
analogizes the problem Janus creates to a decision by the government to 
make taxes voluntary. Fewer people would pay taxes and the ability of 
government to provide services would erode. 129 Worse, unions representing 
public sector employees will likely experience a significant drop in 
membership and union members will experience a significant drop in wages. 
As noted in an article in The Atlantic: 
 
A study by Frank Manzo, the policy director of the Illinois 
Economic Policy Institute, and Robert Bruno, a labor professor at 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, found that a 
decision in favor of Janus could reduce the union membership of 
state and local government employees by 8.2 percentage points, or 
726,000 union members. This will lead to a loss of revenues for the 
unions, and with less money, unions will hire fewer representatives, 
take fewer cases to arbitration, and organize fewer members than 
they once did, Bruno told me. This will likely mean lower pay and 
benefits for public-sector employees: Manzo and Bruno estimate 
the wages of state and local government employees would drop by 
an average of 3.6 percent, and the salaries of public-school teachers 
would drop by an average of 5.4 percent.130 
 
One projection indicates that “[m]ost public-sector unions in more than 
20 states with agency fee laws will get smaller and poorer, with unions losing 
between a tenth and a third of their members.131 Union membership in the 
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United Domestic Workers of America (UDW), which represents home-care 
workers in California, declined dramatically from 68,000 to 48,000 
immediately following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harris, which did 
for home-care worker what Janus had now done for all public-sector 
unions.132 Likewise, in the five year period following Michigan’s passing 
legislation ending mandatory union fees in 2012, membership in the 
Michigan Education Association dropped about 25%.133 Similarly, the 
National Education Association (NEA), the nation’s largest union, fears it 
will lose about 300,000 members over the next two years, or about 10% of its 
3 million members.134 Moreover, to the extent Janus weakens unions and 
negatively affects about 17 million public sector workers across the country, 
it will hurt black women in particular, because they are disproportionately 
represented in public sector jobs and make up 17.7 percent of public sector 
workers, or about 1.5 million workers.135 Likewise, weakened labor unions 
will likely be unable to sustain their progress in narrowing the wage gap 
between men and women.136 
In preparation for and response to Janus, unions have cut their budgets – 
the NEA is prepared to cut about $28 million from its budget and about 40 
members of its staff137 – and embarked on campaigns to convince union 
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members to sign pledge cards confirming their commitment to the union.138 
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) conducted one-on-one meetings 
with union members and potential members asking them to sign “recommit” 
cards in 10 states pledging to continue their membership in the AFT. This 
campaign generated 530,000 recommits among its 1.7 million members,139 
and recommitment rates up to 95 percent in some places.140 Similarly, the 
National Education Association (NEA) has reached out to its members with a 
pledge to fight for racial justice and equal distribution of resources in 
addition to just salary wages.141 That unions can demonstrate strong 
commitment by their members is crucially important, because Janus has 
created the perception that unions have less money, less support from 
politicians, and therefore less power at the bargaining table in terms of being 
able to put pressure on the employer.142 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Janus emphasized the difference 
between public- and private-sector agency shops and noted that collective 
bargaining with a government employer, unlike collective bargaining in the 
private sector, inherently involves political speech,143 some legal 
commentators believe Janus may ultimately be applied to private sector 
unions. Robert Bruno, labor professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, worries that the Janus may help right-to-work activists bring a 
constitutional challenge to mandatory fees in private sector unions.144 Cesar 
Rosado, co-director of the Institute for Law and the Workplace at Chicago-
Kent College of Law, believes there is no significant difference between the 
First Amendment issue in the public sector and the private sector.145 He notes 
that private sector employees are governed by the National Labor Relations 
Act, which requires employers to bargain with the union employees have 
voted to represent them. Those unions impose mandatory dues and fees that 
support lobbying efforts and political campaigns for a wide variety of public 
causes, including public spending and minimum wage levels, which 
employers may oppose and which may impact government spending, thereby 
opening the door to Janus challenges.146 
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Two decisions handed down during the 2017-2018 Supreme Court Term 
has inflicted substantial legal damage on workers and unions. In Epic 
Systems, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld arbitration agreements which 
prohibit collective actions to recover overtime pay owed under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. This decision seriously weakens a significant employee 
safeguard under the National Labor Relations Act, and pits individual 
employees seeking to enforce their right to overtime compensation against 
the enterprise which hired them, a lopsided confrontation indeed, particularly 
for employees who fear retaliation. Moreover, the decision facilitates the 
under enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act by making it cost 
beneficial for employers to underpay workers. Because the expense in 
pursuing individual claims outweighs the potential recovery, there is no 
incentive to seek redress and the “enforcement gap” will widen. Hence the 
ongoing and substantial loss by low wage earners of billions of dollars of 
legally owed wages per year will likely continue unabated. Moreover, 
because arbitration decisions can be kept confidential and lack precedential 
effect, the individually pursued arbitrations will likely give rise to 
incompatible awards in similar claims and inconsistent legal decisions. 
Janus has inflicted equally devastating results on public sector labor 
unions, which will likely get smaller and poorer. Public sector unions will 
experience a significant loss of a secure source of financial support which 
generated tens of millions of dollars in agency fees paid by nonmember 
public employees. Labor unions in twenty-two states, the District of 
Columbia and Puerto Rico must quickly and simultaneously renegotiate their 
public sector collective bargaining agreements in an atmosphere of strained 
labor relations and more radical union actions. Public sector employees may 
experience an average 3.6 percent drop in wages, and the salaries of public-
school teachers may drop by an average of 5.4 percent. Public sector unions 
will likely lose between a tenth and a third of their members, and must 
combat the perception that public sector unions have less money, less support 
from politicians, and therefore less power at the bargaining table. Public 
sector labor unions have been forced to slash their budgets and reduce 
services to their members, at the same time as they undertake campaigns to 
convince members to confirm their commitment to the union. Finally, Janus 
has opened the door to First Amendment attacks on agency fee arrangements 
in private sector collective bargaining agreements. 
  
